III. Thematic Overview: Peace and Security
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Nearly half of the 50 UN peacekeeping missions conducted since the end of the Cold War have taken place in Africa, with many still under way—including one in the DRC, the largest so far. Yet security has taken on a wider definition since in recent years, evolving from the traditional state-centric and ideologically driven approach to a new emphasis on human security. Security is also increasingly seen as a sine qua non for regional integration and development, posing new challenges to African AROs and CSOs and requiring them to think laterally and do business differently.
Human security and development
The AU’s Non-Aggression and Common Defense Pact (2004) defines human security as the security of the individual with respect to the satisfaction of the basic needs of life. Furthermore, human security encompasses “the creation of social, economic, political, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival and dignity of the individual, the protection of and respect for human rights, good governance and the guarantee for each individual of opportunities and choices for his/her full development”.
This definition clearly situates human security in the broader context of development. Poverty constitutes an overarching challenge with between 40 and 60 percent of Africa’s 800 million inhabitants living below the US$1 a day poverty line. HIV/AIDS—accounting for 20 million deaths over last 20 years and 2.3 million in 2003 alone—is a bigger killer than conflicts in Africa. Some 25 million adults are living with AIDS and 11 million children have been orphaned. Added to this are other factors that render Africa’s security challenges even more complex—among them the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the growing number of youth.
The emerging nexus of security and development has also placed greater emphasis on protecting women and children in situations of armed conflict. UN Security Council Resolution 1325, passed on 31 October 2002, recognized the impact of conflict on women and highlighted the pivotal role women could play in addressing these conflicts. Previously, the issue of women and armed conflict had constituted a key plan of the advocacy strategy implemented by African organizations in the run-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, China, in 1995.
Both the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women (2003) and the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2004) speak to the need to ensure the full and effective participation of women in peace processes, and to ban the abuse in conflict situations of girl children as wives or sex slaves. Similarly, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) stresses the need to protect the rights of women and children in situations of armed conflict. However, these issues are considered residual in an environment where AROs are driven by military-led peacekeeping considerations.
Progress and challenges
The AU and the RECs are mandated to take the lead in moving this new security agenda forward, with CSOs assigned a supporting role. An elaborate institutional architecture is spelled out in the 2004 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSC), including provisions for a Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and African Standby Force (ASF). Despite the constraints, progress in rolling out this architecture has been substantial, extending as far as the development of a post-conflict reconstruction framework. Similar arrangements are also in place in the RECs, with ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD (see profiles) emphasizing human security as the bedrock to economic development effort, and prioritizing both. Significantly, and through their respective conflict mechanisms, both the AU and RECs can intervene preemptively to protect civilians in armed conflict. Nevertheless, AROs and CSOs still face a number of constraints that affect their ability to effectively implement the commonly agreed agenda.
One challenge that cuts across the regional landscape and specifically affects AROs is the absence of sufficient of political will to cede national sovereignty in favor of continental decision-making. This is less of an issue at the AU level, where many commitments are non-binding and consensus tends to paper over cracks. However, in the RECs, closer to the ground and more directly relevant to their member states, the exercise of sovereign agendas can lead to sub-regional paralysis. This is evident in IGAD and SADC, for example, where the involvement of member states as parties to conflicts in Somalia and DRC, respectively, has undermined regional efforts. Furthermore, and in practical terms, few member states are willing or able to shoulder the financial burden.
A second challenge is the AU’s ability to coordinate the streamlining and implementation of continental peace and security arrangements. In light of the AU Commission’s weak capacity amid a cascade of competing demands (as highlighted in the profile on p.69), coordination will continue to remain a significant challenge. Indeed, there is a widespread perception that security arrangements in some of the RECs are so far advanced that expecting the AU to coordinate is simply not realistic. ECOWAS is often held up as a market leader in this regard.
A third, and related, challenge is the absence of an overarching strategic framework to connect the various elements of the peace and security architecture. The division of labor among the different organs remains unclear. How the AU’s Panel of the Wise complements or interacts with the ECOWAS Council of Elders and similar structures in other RECs, and how the various early warning systems link with each other, are among the many manifestations of this lack of coherence. A consequence is that while the human security agenda constitutes the dominant discourse of the day, peace-building efforts in practice largely address the symptoms, as opposed to root causes, of conflict in Africa. As such, much remains to be done to breathe life into the consensus of the intertwined nature of security and development.
In this environment, a fourth challenge is that while CSOs are visionary in terms of their appreciation and advocacy of human security concepts and issues, capacity is fragile and engagement is piecemeal. There is a clear lack of systematic CSO involvement in the AU and RECs, at a time when some authoritarian African governments are reneging on respect for rights and shunting aside concerns for human security.
A few leading CSOs specializing in research, convening, capacity building and technical assistance (see profiles on ISS, SaferAfrica and CCR) have adopted the AU architecture to guide their programming. However, most CSOs working in the field have not seen fit to do the same, instead often pursuing particular objectives with scant ability to deliver and poor awareness of the surrounding institutional landscape. That said, the establishment by ECOWAS of the West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF) in 2003 and the work of the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) demonstrate what is possible at sub-regional level. In other sub-regions, the recognition of civil society’s role has not yet been translated into concrete mechanisms.
Opportunities and constraints
In theory, the new AU organs intended to systematize the involvement of CSOs constitute positive developments, but in practice they remain works in progress. The AU’s ECOSOCC, which draws its inspiration from the Arusha Declaration, is under pressure to resolve bureaucratic, complex and opaque procedures for membership; eventually it will allow for substantive CSO engagement around peace and security, including at the technical level. The Pan-African Parliament (PAP), set up in 2004, includes a provision for debating the AU peace and security budget, and its president sits in the closed AU summits. The PAP can bring matters to the PSC, an important window for civil society given that the PAP will have full legislative, oversight powers in 5 years, when its members are elected. ECOSOCC, however, will remain advisory.
The Protocol establishing the PSC also allows CSOs to bring matters to its attention, while the Panel of the Wise can solicit CSO input in providing advice to the PSC. Similarly, the AU’s Peace and Security Directorate collaborates with civil society on an ad hoc basis, although its partners are few and there remains no real strategy for working systematically with wider African civil society. The AU’s 6th sixth region, the African Diaspora, is another potential channel of influence.
Ultimately, the advent of the AU and continued development of the RECs has opened up significant space for CSOs to take ownership of the continental agenda. However, unless and until mechanisms are put in place to ensure coherent and consistent funding aimed at advancing a people-centered peace and security agenda, AROs will continue to dominate the field. Yet they will face mounting pressure to stop proliferating continental standards and instead focus on achieving impact on the basis of existing ones. Inevitably, as they get better at raising funds and developing strategic programs, some non-state actors will move away from engagement with AROs and focus on parallel and alternative actions in the peace and security domain. There will be a much stronger and more concerted focus by non-state actors on human security.
